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The Warren Court
and the Discretionary
Power of the Executivet
An important problem currently confronting the United
States government as a result of the Cold War is that of
protecting the security of the nation-often necessarily accomplished through rather arbitrary,discretionaryaction of
the Executive-and at the same time providing judicial
justice in concrete instances to persons adversely affected
by such executive action. ProfessorHorn examines the limitations imposed on the discretionarypower of the Executive
by the Warren Court,concluding that these restrictionsmay
not necessarily have diminished that power. However, he is
critical of the manner in which the decisions have been
reached and suggests that a more frank and flexible approach would benefit both the Court and the Executive.

Robert A. Horn*
Any attempt to assess the effects of the decisions of the Warren
Court upon the discretionary powers exercisable under the Constitution by the executive branch is met by certain difficulties inherent in
the problem. Since the appointment of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, two
appraisals of current presidential power have received unusually
wide attention. Professor Clinton Rossiter concluded in The Amenriican Presidency that "the outstanding feature of American constitutional development has been the growth of the power and prestige of
the Presidency" and predicted a continuation of that development.'
On the other hand, Mr. Walter Lippman declared in Essays in The
Public Philosophythat "the democratic disaster of the twentieth century" is attributable to the fact that "the power of the executive has
become enfeebled, often to the verge of impotence." 2 Two such conf This Article is a revised version of a paper delivered by the author at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C., September 10, 1959.
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Stanford University.
1. RossrrEa, TH A.mucA.x PrEsm=,,cY 62 (1956).
2. LiPpmAN, EssAYs in TH Puauc Pamosopny 55 (1955).
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flicting estimates of the present status of executive power, by eminent
publicists and scholars who presumably examined essentially the
same phenomena, illustrate the uncertainty which underlies any
analysis of executive power.
Another difficulty is presented by the fact that neither Mr. Lippman nor Professor Rossiter suggests that the judiciary has played a
leading role in defining the scope of contemporary executive power.
Moreover, major studies of the Presidency, including the relation of
the executive and judicial branches, cast doubt on any notion that the
courts have ever played such a part, now or in the past.'
Furthermore, great as the powers of the Executive may be, most
of them are exercised pursuant to statute. On the other hand, executive officers possess broad discretion in statutory interpretation. Thus,
many cases involve the relations between the Court and both the
other branches, not simply one of them. Yet, this Article is not concerned with the effects of the Court's decisions upon the whole scope
of the Executive's statutory and constitutional powers, but deals only
with those cases which affect the independently exercisable powers
of the Executive. Hence, the amplitude of discretion left with the
President by Congress and the Constitution must be one criterion for
the selection of pertinent cases. One important decision of the Warren Court will illustrate the general nature of the cases excluded from
consideration by that criterion. In United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles,4 a civilian, after honorable discharge from the service, had
been arrested by military authorities and taken from the United
States to Korea to stand trial by court martial for a murder he was
alleged to have committed prior to discharge. In form, the decision
was directed to the executive branch, for it ordered the Secretary of
the Air Force to release the defendant from custody. But in an article
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Congress had provided for
the action taken by the executive.5 The only discretion left to the
military authorities, if it can properly be called that at all, was either
to proceed as they had or to abandon their claim of executive power
and seek conviction in federal court. In such a case, the onus for
transgressing constitutional bounds properly lies on Congress rather
than the executive branch. 6
3. See particularly ScuaBavT, THE PRESmENCY ni T=E CouR-s (1957).

4. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
5. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 3(a), 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1956).
6. See 850 U.S. at 23. Congress had passed § 803(a) against the advice of the
Judge Advocate General of the Army. Hearings Before A Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee On Armed Services On S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 169767 at 256-57 (1949). The constitutional implications of the statement by
the Judge Advocate General of the Army were supported by the testimony of the
Assistant General Counsel of the Department of Defense. Hearings Before A Subcommittee Of The House Subcommittee Of The Committee On Armed Services On
H.R. 2498 at 881 (1949).
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Also excluded from consideration here are the many decisions of
the Supreme Court which deal with the routine exercise of power
by independent commissions and administrative officials to whom
Congress has committed executive authority. Quantitatively, these
decisions have an important bearing on the executive branch, but
they present problems beyond the scope of this Article. The day is
past when they are generally argued, let alone decided, as constitu-

tional questions.7

Finally, it must be remembered that the record of the Warren

Court to date rests on the somewhat haphazard course of litigation
presented by only six annual terms. To be other than impressionistic

here is to indulge in delusive exactness, for the statistical universe of
the Court's major decisions regarding executive power is much too
small to permit statistical exposition. But even if one thinks dramatically rather than statistically, those decisions have not been the most

controversial and exciting aspect of the Warren Court's work. Fortune has not brought it a case in the area of executive power which

compares with the steel seizure case 8 of the Vinson Court, nor with

its own decision in the school segregation cases. 9 Yet, it has been add-

ing to what Mr. Justice Frankfurter has called the "coral reef of
constitutional law."
Delusive exactness though it may be, a few statistical observations

are of interest. In the Warren Court's fifteen decisions concerning executive power,1" it was unanimous in only four cases ;11 and in one of
these it is quite likely that only Mr. Justice Clark's nonparticipation
kept it so.:" Despite their importance, two of the cases were disposed
of by per curiam opinions." Perhaps more revealing is the simple
statistic that in only four cases did the Supreme Court affirm the
lower court's decision.' 4 One other statistic is startling, especially
LAw TRETISE § 2.01 (1958).
8. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
9. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Seventeen decisions of the Warren Court involve circumstances in which the
Executive had been left with some independently-exercisable discretion. But the
Court vacated its original decisions in Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956) and
Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956), and reached a different result in both
cases in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). This Article discusses only the latter
decision.
11. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S.
524 (1957); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957); United States v. Guy W. Capps,
Inc., 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
12. Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
13. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524
7. See 1 DAvs, AmosTmRA=rI

(1957).

14. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Kinsella
v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1 (1957); United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 348 U.S. 296 (1955). In both
Guagliardo and Reid the Court affirmed the decision of one lower court and reversed that of another.
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when considered in conjunction with the foregoing: the government
won only one of these fifteen cases,15 while another is more properly
described as a draw on the important constitutional issue of executive
power.' 6 Clearly the Warren Court is no rubber stamp for the Executive. And it has been less sympathetic to claims of executive authority
than the lower federal courts.
The cases fall into two broad categories. The removal power of the
executive was the constitutional problem in seven cases, all of which
the government lost.'7 All but one of the seven dealt with dismissals
resulting from loyalty-security programs of the national government.' 8 Expressed in its broadest terms, the other consitutional problem concerns the President's power over the conduct of foreign
relations. The President's authority to make executive agreements
with foreign nations was at issue in six cases, 9 while the remaining
two dealt with executive power to limit the foreign travel of American citizens.2 0 In general, the Warren Courts concern with powers
branch has reflected the country's struggles in the
of the executive
2
Cold War. '
I. TE IlEMOvAL PowEn
Of the seven cases which concerned the removal power, only one
involved a removal by the President.22 Four arose out of removal of
federal employees by other executive officers.28 The remaining two
cases broke new ground: one dealt with the type of discharge papers
which the military services may issue ' and the other with loss of
private employment as a consequence of security regulations. 25 It

may be noted that a majority of the Supreme Court has not yet upheld the dismissal of any person by the national government on
loyalty-security grounds.26
15. Wilson v. Girard, 854 U.S. 524 (1957).
16. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 848 U.S. 296 (1955).
17. Green v. United States, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535
(1959); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 849 (1958); Harmon v. Brucker, 355
U.S. 579 (1958); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 863 (1957); Cole v. Young, 851 U.S.
536 (1956); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955). An eighth case was declared
moot: Taylor v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 709 (1959).
18. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), dealt with removal for patronage purposes.
19. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957);
United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
20. Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958), and Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958).
21. Only two cases deal with problems not related to the Cold War: Wiener v.
United States, 857 U.S. 349 (1958), and United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 348
U.S. 296 (1955).
22. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
23. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 859 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363
(1957); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
24. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
25. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
26. But see Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), where the decision of a
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So much has been written about the civil liberties issues in these
loyalty-security cases that it is easy to forget that they are, after all,
removal-power cases. 27 In considering questions about the removal
power which these cases present, it is necessary to emphasize the
problems of executive power, and to avoid the temptation to dwell
upon civil liberties issues; yet thorough analysis does require adequate consideration of civil liberties. This conflict which inheres in
any approach to the removal problem may be mollified by stipulating
two facts preliminary to investigation and analysis. First, either the
President or Congress, and sometimes both, have repeatedly authorized and prescribed removal of those found to be loyalty or security
risks. Second, the Supreme Court has never intimated that the
establishment of such grounds for removal is unconstitutional; rather,
it has repeatedly assumed the contrary, and has been concerned only
with the manner in which security measures have been adopted and
implemented. There can be no dispute about what "is" in any of
these respects, and this Article assumes that, except for the manner
of adoption and implementation, there need be none about what
"ought to be."
It will help keep the loyalty-security removal cases in perspective
to consider first the one decision of the Warren Court which concerns removal on other grounds, for the conception of executive
power under the Constitution and the scope of judicial review found
in that case also pervade the loyalty-security cases. In Wiener v.
United States 2 a former member of the War Claims Commission
sued to recover his salary after his removal by the President. The
President had regarded it as "in the national interest" to have "personnel of my own selection" on the Commission,29 that is, the President regarded the office as a patronage position. And why not? In
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States'0 the Supreme Court had indicated
that if Congress authorized the President to remove members of
regulatory commissions for specified causes, removal for any other
reason would be held contrary to congressional intent. But in establishing the War Claims Commission, Congress had been completely
fairly inferred that Congress
silent about removal, and the President
31
had regarded the office just as he did.

court of appeals upholding a dismissal was affirmed per curiam by an equally divided
Court.
27. Extensive citation of the voluminous literature dealing with civil liberties aspects of the loyalty-security programs seems unnecessary here. See, e.g., an outstanding recent study: BRowN, LoYArrv AND SEcunTrY: EMPLOYMENT TEsTs IN THE
UNnrED SATrs (1958).
28. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
29. Id. at 350.
80. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
31. The Commission was established pursuant to the War Claims Act of 1948,
62 Stat. 1240, as extended by 65 Stat. 28 (1951). Not only was Congress silent
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But a unanimous Supreme Court, in a brief opinion, held that the
President had erred in inferring a power to remove without causewithout even mentioning why the inference might reasonably have
been drawn. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the majority, subordinated
the constitutional issues arising from the quasi-judicial nature of the
functions of the commission, while conceding that, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, ascertainment of congressional intent "is a
problem in probabilities." But he returned to the constitutional issue
of division of powers by indirection in concluding that "the most
reliable factor for drawing an inference . . . is the nature of the

function that Congress vested in the Commission." 32 Since that
function was to "adjudicate according to law" the claims before it,"s
an assignment which Congress might have chosen to give the federal
courts, it would be as bad for the President to attempt to influence the
Commission as to attempt to influence the courts. The Court concluded:
[A] fortiori must it be inferred that Congress did not wish to have hang
over the Commission the Damocles' sword of removal by the President
for no reason other than that he preferred . . .men of his own choosing.

[Nio such power is given to the President directly by the Constitution,
upon him by statute simply because Conand none is impliedly conferred
34
gress said nothing about it.

Some criticism of this opinion may be directed at the Court's refusal to recognize an inherent power of removal and at the criterion
of an "adjudicatory function" on which the Court relied in finding
that Congress did not intend to grant the power of removal without
cause. Critics may point to the Court's admission that Congress might
have dispensed the war claims itself, or vested administration of the
claims in an executive officer who, it can be implied from the opinion, may constitutionallyhave been made subject to the President's

removal power.35 A sufficient answer to this is that weight ought to

be given to the fact that Congress did not choose to place settlement
of these claims in hands so open to political influence.
But if "the nature of the function" performed by the officer is the
criterion for testing a claim of inherent presidential removal power,
other critics may observe that the Cabinet Secretaries and many
about removal, but it had not required a bi-partisan composition for the Commission
- seemingly an additional indication that it intended the commissioners' positions
to be treated as patronage.
32. 357 U.S. at 353.
33. Id. at 855.
34. Id. at 356.
35. Id. at 355. In discussing the legislative history of the War Claims Act, the
Court noted that the original House version of the bill had placed administration
of claims in the hands of the Federal Security Administrator - 'an arm of the President." Id. at 354.
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other executive officers heretofore considered subject to removal at
the pleasure of the President also perform quasi-judicial functions.
It should be obvious that the Court would never interfere in the
political process to the extent of holding that such duties immunize
those officials from summary removal. But this is not to say that
removal of such an officer solely because he refused to render a
quasi-judicial decision according to the President's request would
necessarily be legitimate. 3 The objections to this criterion of "function" thus seem to present more of a dialectical resource for those
who are determined to find fault with the case than a practical danger to effective presidential control of anything he is entitled to control or ought even to want to control.
The criterion of an "adjudicatory function" which controlled the
result in Wiener raises yet another question which was not presented for resolution in that case: whether the President has power,
absent statutory authorization, to remove an officer performing such
a function whom he believes guilty of crime or other improper conduct. The Court clearly distinguished such a case from the Wiener
situation, involving removal for political purposes, when it observed
that here was no "removal for cause involving the rectitude of a
member of an adjudicatory body. . . ." 37 Nevertheless, some critics
will insist that if, as the Court said, "no such power is given to the
President directly by the Constitution, and none is impliedly conferred on him by statute simply because Congress said nothing
about it," then the Court cannot, consistent with the proper scope
of judicial review, distinguish between the two grounds for removal.
The tempting short answer- that the two cases can be different
because the Court can make them different-would merely confirm
the objection. The better answer is that the whole idea of an inherent power of removal is only a convenient fiction which had to be
invented because the Framers were as silent about a removal power
in the Constitution as Congress was in the War Claims Act. Recognition of the Supreme Court's function of filling the "open spaces in
the law" 8 requires recognition of the fact that in some instances the
same distinctions which can be made in construing a statute on the
assumption that Congress intended to adopt a wise public policy
should also be made as a matter of constitutional wisdom.
Of the four cases which dealt with removal of federal employees
on loyalty-security
grounds, Peters v. Hobby"9 and Service v. Dul1es 40 are relatively minor in importance, although they were the
36. Cf. Kendall v. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
37. 357 U.S. at 356.
38. CA-.Dozo, TnE NATuRE op THE JUDIcrAL PToCEss 113 (1921).
39. 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
40. 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
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ones treated as causes celebres by the press, probably because they
involved persons of prominence or notoriety in contrast to the obscure civil servants involved in the two more important cases.
Petersv. Hobby was the first loyalty-security case decided by the
Warren Court and provoked the greatest division among its members.4 ' Dr. Peters had been cleared by the loyalty board of the Federal Security Agency, first without a hearing, and again after a hearing recommended by the President's Loyalty Review Board. When
the Federal Security Agency's hearing resulted in a renewed clearance, the Loyalty Review Board, on its own motion, also held a hearing that resulted in a finding adverse to Dr. Peters and a direction
for his dismissal. The Loyalty Review Board derived its power from
Executive Order No. 9835, which provided: "The Board shall have
authority to review cases involving persons recommended for dismissal . . . and to make advisory recommendations thereon to the

head of the employing department or agency. Such cases may be
referred to the Board either by the employing . . . agency, or by

the officer or employee involved." 42 Indisputably, Dr. Peters had not
been recommended for dismissal by the agency board, nor had he
or his agency referred his case to the Loyalty Review Board. The
Court held that in the absence of a prior dismissal and proper referral, the Loyalty Review Board had exceeded its delegated authority
to "advise" by providing for a hearing on its own motion.
Dr. Peters' principal constitutional contention had been that the
use of secret evidence from unidentified informants who cannot be
confronted and cross-examined invalidates dismissal proceedings. It
is not strange that the Supreme Court did not pass on the question
-it

had once before 43 and has twice since failed to do so. 44 Some

of the severest critics of the federal loyalty-security programs have
agreed that in some circumstances the use of secret evidence is justified. 45 But despite the Court's reliance upon interpretation of the
executive order, one may surmise that a majority of the Court might
not have been prepared to deny Dr. Peters' constitutional contention.
The main question raised by the holding that the Loyalty Review
41. Mr. Chief justice Warren wrote the opinion of the Court, Justices Black and
Douglas concurred separately, and justices Reed and Burton dissented. Both Justices
Black and Douglas preferred to decide the case on the constitutional issue of the
petitioner's right to confront his accusers. It is not clear whether the petitioner had
in fact challenged the procedures of the Loyalty Review Board, the invalidity of
which was made the basis for decision. Compare 357 U.S. at 337 with id. at 350.
42. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935, 1937 (1947).
43. Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
44. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535
(1959).
45. See particularly AsSOcITION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF Nav Yo, r, REPORT
oF THE SPEcAL CoMMrrr.E ON TnE FEDERAL. LOYALTY-SECURIrY PROGRAM 174-80
(1956), and BoNTEcuE, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SEcuRITY PoGIAM 246-48 (1953).
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Board had exceeded the authority delegated by the President stems
from a further power delegated to the Board: "The Board shall
make rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of
this order, deemed necessary to implement statutes and Executive
Orders relating to employee loyalty. 46 Pursuant to that authority,
the Board had promulgated a regulation which provided for "postaudits" of agency security boards' actions and included a power to
reverse a determination favorable to the employee.4 7 The proceedings overturned in Peters were taken in accordance with that
regulation.
Although it may be argued that the power to "make rules and

regulations" did not confer any further substantive power, it is indisputable that there was nothing in the executive order which explicitly forbade the invalidated proceedings. And the post-audit
regulation, as the dissent pointed out, had been adopted at the
beginning of the program, and action under it had been formally
reported to the President, who in amending Executive Order No.
9835 by Executive Order No. 10241, left post-audits undisturbed.48
Was post-audit of prior findings favorable to the employee nevertheless inconsistent with the intent of the President? Reasonable men
not only might disagree-they did.
Before the case was decided, Executive Orders No. 9835 and
10241 had been supplanted by Executive Order No. 10450. Under
that order, the Peters case could not have arisen, nor can such
cases arise in the future.49 Thus, for executive power, the most lasting significance of the case may well be an observation made by
Mr. Justice Reed in his dissent:
The Court in this case is reviewing a Presidential Order and rules made
thereunder. I do not find it as easy as does the majority to analogize such
review to judicial review of congressional Acts and administrative interpretation of such Acts. Certain differences are immediately apparent. The
46. Exec. Order No. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935, 1937 (1947).
47. See Loyalty Review Board Regulation 14, 13 Fed. Reg. 255 (1947) as
amended, 17 Fed. Reg. 631 (1952).
48. The dissent noted that "the results of the Review Board's post-audit actions
...
were unmistakenly recorded" in the Annual Reports of the Civil Service Commission from 1948 through 1952, and that the reports showed that the Board had
been reviewing determinations favorable to the employee. 349 U.S. at 353-54.
Exec. Order No. 10241, 16 Fed. Reg. 3690 (1951). However, the significance of
the Presidents failure to modify post-audit procedures may be limited by the fact
that the purpose of the new order was to modify merely the prescribed standard
for removal.
49. Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953). Section 11 of the order
required the Board, in winding up pending appeals, to remand to the department
and agency boards any case in which it disagreed with the previous determination.
Section 12 provided for abolition of the Loyalty Review Board upon completion of
its pending business.
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Executive Branch is traditionally free to handle its internal problems of
administration in its own way. The legality of judicial review of such intra-

executive operations as this is, for me, not completely free from doubt.5O

Of course one can reply that these "intra-executive operations" affected important private rights. But so do countless others which
have nothing to do with loyalty-security programs. If the type and
scope of review employed in the Peters case were extended to "intraexecutive operations" outside the sphere of security programs which
may encroach on the constitutionally-sensitive rights of belief and
association, would such extension advance the rule of law, or would
it be an insupportable obstacle to effective administration?
The administrative procedures reviewed in Service v. Dulles,5
even more complex and dilatory than those involved in the Peters
case, 52 also included "post-audit" review by the President's Loyalty
Review Board of a prior decision favorable to Service rendered by
the State Department's loyalty board. The Loyalty Review Board
made findings adverse to Service and recommended his dismissal;
this recommendation was acceded to by the Secretary of State without further independent consideration. Utilization of the "postaudit" review procedure would have invalidated the Secretary's
action if it had been authorized only by the executive order as construed in the Peters case. But in Service, the Secretary claimed that
the power to support his action was conferred not only by executive order but also by the oft-reenacted "McCarran Rider," which
provided:
Notwithstanding the provisions of . . . any other law, the Secretary of
State may, in his absolute discretion . . . terminate the employment of

any officer or employee of the Department of State or of the Foreign Service of the United States whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.5 3

The Department of State had promulgated regulations detailing
the procedures to be followed in loyalty-security cases, applicable to
action under both the McCarran Rider and the Executive order. Under a regulation adopted in 1949, as the Court paraphrased it, "the
action of the Deputy Under Secretary, if favorable to the employee,
was to be final, the Secretary reserving to himself power to act
50. 349 U.S. at 354.
51. 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
52. Before he was finally fired by Secretary Acheson, Service had thrice been
cleared by the State Department's loyalty board. Three times the President's Loyalty
Review Board had conducted "post-audits," and had twice ordered new hearings
by the departmental board.
53. 65 Stat. 581 (1951). The McCarran Rider was attached to various appropriation bills from 1946 to 1952. See 66 Stat. 555 (1952); 64 Stat. 768 (1951); 63
Stat. 456 (1949); 62 Stat. 315-16 (1948); 61 Stat. 288 (1947); 60 Stat. 458
(1946).
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further only if his Deputy's action was unfavorable to the employee." r4 Furthermore, a regulation adopted in 1951 provided that
a decision for removal should "be reached after considerationof the
complete file, arguments, briefs, and testimony presented." r5 But
the Secretary, in dismissing Service, had overruled a prior favorable
decision by the Deputy Under Secretary and had, as he stated in an
affidavit, "made no independent judgment on the record in this
case." 6 Thus, neither of the departmental regulations had been
followed.
The decisive question, then, was whether or not the Secretary was
bound to follow the departmental regulations in exercising "his absolute discretion" under the McCarran Rider. The Court, citing a
similar holding in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,57
held that he was.
Although procedural formality is undoubtedly an essential means
of protecting constitutional rights, the degree of formality insisted
upon by the Court in Service evidences the influence of the more
difficult constitutional problem raised by Service's contention that
the findings and opinion of the Loyalty Review Board "were based
upon procedures assertedly contrary to due process of law." 8 That
implication is strengthened by the fact that the Court cited very
weak precedent in support of its holding and strained more than a
little in its construction of the "McCarran Rider." Thus, in relying on
the first Accardi case, the Court ignored the practical reduction to
shambles of the sweeping rhetoric of that opinion in the second Accardi case. 9 If, on the other hand, Accardi I is to be regarded as
good authority, that case must also stand for its proposition that
departmental regulations have "the force and effect of law."6 r Then
surely the departmental regulations in Service were "law" as that
word was used in the McCarran Rider, which gave the Secretary
discretion "not withstanding any other provision of law." Therefore,
if a constitutional implication is not to be drawn from the Service
opinion, one must try to understand that what Congress really
meant was that the Secretary had absolute discretion "notwithstand54. 354 U.S. at 384-85 interpreting U.S. DEPr. oF STATE, M ruAL OF REGu APRocEDumS beginning at § 390 (1949).
55. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, MANUAL OF REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES § 393.1
(1951).
56. 354 U.S. at 369. The Secretary explained his failure to make an "independent
judgment" on the grounds that he "deemed it appropriate and advisable to act on
the basis of the finding and opinion of the Loyalty Review Board." Id.
57. 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
58. 354 U.S. at 372.
59. Shaughnessy v. United States ex -el. Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955).
60. 347 U.S. at 265.
TrONS Am
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ing any other provision of law except such provisions of law as he
has promulgated."
The decision in Cole v. Young 6 has more general application, for
it limits the power of discretionary removal of persons generally protected by a statutory right to a hearing to those cases which involve
employees in "sensitive" positions with respect to national security.
Nevertheless, the decision is of only a limited practical effect, for the
procedures required by statute are not generally significant barriers
to removal.62
. . .any
In 1950 Congress passed an act which "notwithstanding..
in their
agencies,
sensitive
of
eleven
the
heads
authorized
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officer
civilian
pay
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without
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The act also provides for extension of these provisions to other departments and agencies by the President when he deems it "necessary in the best interests of national security." 64 By Executive
Order No. 10450, President Eisenhower brought the entire executive
branch under the act.65
Subsequently Cole, a pure food and drug inspector for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, was dismissed under this
authority. In an opinion less tortuous than those in Peters and
Service, the Court held the dismissal void. Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, demonstrated convincingly that despite its unqualified language, Congress had intended the act -at least when
applied to agencies other than those specified-to cover only employees in positions which are "sensitive" in terms of their possible
effects on national security. The Department Secretary had made
no preliminary finding that Cole's position was "sensitive," for the
terms of the Presidential Order which had extended and implemented the act did not require that exercise of the "absolute discretion" accorded department heads be predicated upon any such
preliminary finding. 66 Hence the Court held that the summary dismissal had deprived Cole of his statutory right of appeal to the
Civil Service CommissionYT The Court attempted to avoid an out61. 851 U.S. 536 (1956).

62. PrrcHErr, TnE PoLrricAL OFFENDER AND TH= WAREN CoURT 51 (1957).

63. 64 Stat. 476 § 1 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-1 (1958).
64. 64 Stat. 476 § 3 (1950), 5 U.S.C. § 22-3 (1958).
65. Exec. Order No. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
66. The Court read the order as enjoining upon agency heads "the duty of
discharging any employee of doubtful loyalty, irrespective of the character of his
job and its relationship to the 'national security.'" 351 U.S. at 522.
67. Cole was protected by The Veteran's Preference Act, 58 Stat. 387 (1944),
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right declaration that the President as well as the Secretary had
acted illegally, by assuming "for purposes of this decision" that the
68
executive order had accomplished a valid extension of the act.
However, it was forced to qualify that assumption by recognizing
that "the basis for our decision is simply that the standard prescribed by the executive order and applied by the Secretary is not
in conformity with the Act."69 This patent inconsistency prompted
the dissent to note that "the reasoning of the opinion makes that
extension a fortiori unauthorized." 70
In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Clark exposed a major constitutional issue which the Court succeeded in ignoring only by its
rather ficticious assumption. By effectively striking down the President's extension of the act, the Court raised
a question as to the constitutional power of the President to authorize
dismissal of executive employees whose further employment he believes
to be inconsistent with national security. This power might arise from the
grant of executive
power in Article II of the Constitution, and not from
71
Congress.

Should the constitutional powers of the President be interpreted to
include inherent power to authorize dismissals for security reasons
at the discretion of a department head? The Wiener case perhaps
hints that the Warren Court doubts that it should be. But assuming
the existence of such an inherent power and that Congress intended
to limit that power to removal of persons in "sensitive" positions, can
it do so constitutionally? Any answer the Court could give must affect the distribution of powers. Probably the majority would quote
Mr. Justice Jackson's statement in the steel seizure case:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting
upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what
is at stake is the
72
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.

But was the Court justified in Cole in being so cautious as to refrain from openly scrutinizing the conflicting claims of congressional
and presidential power?
5 U.S.C. § 851 (1958), which then required that preference eligibles "shall have
the right to appeal to the Civil Service Commission" and other procedural rights.
68. 851 U.S. at 542.
69. Id. at 557.
70. Id. at 566.
71. Id. at 568.
72. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952).
(Emphasis added.)
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In Vitarelli v. Seaton,73 the Court recently reafrmed its commitment to the requirement that departmental procedures, once established, must be rigidly adhered to. The decision, in which the Court
was unanimous on all important issues, was pronounced by Mr.
Justice Harlan in a refreshingly straightforward opinion. By the
terms of his contract, Dr. Vitarelli could have been dismissed at the
discretion of the Secretary of the Interior, at any time and without
cause. Instead, he was dismissed "in the interest of national security"
after service of charges and a hearing before the departmental security board. Although the proceedings had been taken under the
same authority as in Cole's case, and there had been no finding
that the position occupied by Vitarelli was "sensitive," the Court did
not rely upon the Cole requirement that a finding of "sensitivity"
precede dismissal. Nor did it choose to base its decision on constitutional grounds. Rather, the Court took the occasion to reaffirm its
adherence to the Service rule that, at least in constitutionally questionable circumstances, strict compliance with departmental dismissal procedures will be required.
The department had promulgated procedural regulations for the
handling of its security cases, but had violated them in three important respects. The regulations required that the statement of
charges be as specific and detailed as security considerations permit,
that departmental security board hearings be "orderly" and limited
to consideration of "relevant," "competent," and "material" matters,
and that employees have the right to cross-examine opposing, nonconfidential witnesses. 74 But at the hearing, the scope of the ques5
tions went far beyond the specific statement of charges,7 and expanded beyond the relevant and material into a wide-ranging
76
inquisition into Vitarelli's educational, social, and political beliefs.
Further, he was denied an opportunity to cross-examine a witness
who, since his name was in the record, was obviously not a
confidential informant. 77 The Court held that having given "national
security" as the reason for dismissal, the department was bound to
follow its own regulations. 78 Thus, whatever may be the importance
of the constitutional issues implicit in failure to conform to those
prescribed procedures, this case effectively illustrates that a requirement of adherence to such procedural formalities may protect important constitutional rights.
73. 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
74. These procedural protections were required by Dept. of Interior Order No.
2738, Nov. 9, 1958, §§ 15(a), 21(a), (e), & 21(c)(4) respectively, cited by the
Court, 359 U.S. at 540, 542, 544.
75. Id. at 541 & n.4.
76. Id. at 542-43 & n.5.
77. Id. at 544-45.
78. Id. at 549. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Clark, Whittaker, and
Stewart, concurred in part and dissented in part.
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Harmon v. Brucker 79 involved the discharge of two soldiers on
grounds of security risk. The soldiers commenced litigation, claiming that the Army Review Board and the Secretary of the Army had
improperly considered their pre-induction activities in denying them
an "honorable discharge" certificate. 0 The Board and the Secretary
had acted pursuant to a statute which provided that the findings of
the Board "shall be based upon all available records . . ." and that
those findings are "final subject only to review by the Secretary of
the Army." S'
The Solicitor General of the United States denied the jurisdiction
of the courts to review the Secretary's approval of the Board's find82
ing but conceded that if they had power, the Secretary was wrong.
This startling desertion left, so to speak, the Army's left flank
exposed. In a per curiam opinion the Court swiftly put the Army
to rout, saying that if the Secretary had "acted in excess of powers
granted him by Congress . . . his actions would not constitute exercises of his administrative discretion," and that the federal courts
had power "to construe the statutes involved to determine whether
the respondent did exceed his powers. " 83 Thus, the Justices demonstrated, as they have in the past, that whenever they believe an
administrative abuse demands judicial correction they have little
difficulty in concluding that "final" does not mean final.Having disposed of the jurisdictional question, the Court quite
reasonably concluded that Congress intended that "the type of discharge to be issued is to be determined solely by the soldier's military record . . ." and that therefore "'records,' as used in the statute, means recordsof military service ....
s 8In this way the Court
S
avoided passing on the question whether the statute as construed
and applied by the Secretary violated due process. But the result
stands in the great tradition of what has been called "natural
justice."
The importance of the Court's recent decision in Greene v. McElroy"' transcends the limitations which that decision places upon
the removal power, for it imposes substantial qualifications upon
other discretionary powers of the executive. The Defense Department's Industrial Personnel Security Program 7 may well depend
79. 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
80. The activities alleged against them were their associations with persons and
groups considered subversive or of questionable loyalty. Id. at 584 (dissenting
opinion).
81. 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (1958).
82. 355 U.S. at 582.
83. Id. at 581-82.
84. See, e.g., Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
85. 355 U.S. at 583.
86. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
87. Ba'onT OF THE COMrISSION ON G0v
MENT SECVBR
235-319 (1957),
gives a full and authoritative history of the program.
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for its effectiveness upon the revelations of secret informants who
cannot, consistently with the degree of secrecy required by national
security, be required to confront the accused. If that is true, the
Court's opinion in Greene left the future of that program in doubt.
The Court claimed to decide "only that in the absence of explicit
authorization from either the President or Congress . . ."the De-

fense Department could not deny clearance to an aeronautical
engineer with the practical effect of barring him from his work by
"a proceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of
confrontation and cross-examination."I s But the constitutional
overtones in the Court's discussion of the "questionable constitution-

ality" 89 of any procedures which deny confrontation, led Justices

Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker to concur only in the judgment,
"intimating no views as to the validity of those procedures." 90 And
Mr. Justice Clark, who dissented alone, predicted that the opinion
"speaks in prophecy" on the constitutional questionY1
As the Chief Justice posed the issue,
the question which must be decided in this case is not whether the President has inherent power to act or whether Congress has granted him such

a power; rather, it is whether either the President or Congress exercised
to the Department of Defense the authority to
such a power and delegated
92
fashion such a program.

The question posed by the Chief Justice presents, more precisely,
two issues. First, what acts or omissions of action, or both in combination, should be taken as a legally sufficient indication that either
the President or Congress has exercised the power of delegation? It
may be that a statute, an executive order, a memorandum, or even
the spoken word is each sufficient in the proper circumstances -but
if other means of delegation are insufficient, in particular the silent
acquiescence of an executive official, the efficiency of government
operations must suffer. The second issue is, how specifically must the
chosen means of delegation identify the particular authority delegated? This question of the requisite specificity of standards is a
familiar one in the case of congressional, but not presidential,
delegation. 3
Delegation by silent acquiescence, that is, omission of any showing of approval or repudiation., presents, in its most difficult form, the
problem of determining the existence and scope of a delegation.
88. 860 U.S. at 508.

89. Id. at 506. But see Chase, The Warren Court and Congress, 44 MINN. L.

595, 616-19 (1960).
90. 860 U.S. at 508.
91. Id. at 524.
92. Id. at 496.
98. See generally 1 DAvis, ADMwmnmATnv

LAw TnEAns= § 2.03 (1958).

REv.
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Although silence may often import consent, the legal sufficiency of
the delegation which consent may imply is necessarily limited by
its uncertainty. Moreover, silent acquiesence is also the least specific
manner in which delegation can be made. Perhaps it is a legal fiction
that the consent to be implied from silence delegates any authority.
And, though some delegation be established, the question remains,
what has been delegated? It may be piling fiction upon fiction to
add that the scope of authority can be drawn from silence. But if
these are fictions, they are necessarily generated by constitutional
government, which requires that all authority establish its legitimacy upon proper challenge. Appraisal of the authority claimed to
arise out of silent acquiescence thus becomes a duty of the judiciary,
which should perform its task by discounting the scope of the
authority claimed by the uncertainty that the power of delegation
was exercised, or that it was exercised with determinable specificity.
In Greene, the Chief Justice acknowledged that certain ambiguous documents and the knowing silence of the President and Congress indicated with sufficient certainty that some degree of power
had been delegated, for he declared: "[E]ven in the absence of specific delegation we have no difficulty in finding, as we do, that the
Department of Defense has been authorized to fashion and apply
an industrial clearance program which affords affected persons the
safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination."" But the Court
went on to hold that a program which denied those safeguards fell
outside the scope of the authorization which it had recognized.
What various acts or omissions could have been a legally sufficient
indication of specific delegation to the Defense Department to carry
out this program in all its details? No statute or executive order had
expressly authorized an industrial security progam. The evidence
"in writing" which might have established an "implicit delegation"
was inconclusive at best.95 Hence, the best evidence of an effective
delegation was a long period of knowing silence, for both Congress
and the President had actual knowledge of the program, and they
knew that it included denial of confrontation. 6
Meeting this evidence, the Court articulated an emerging, if not
new, principle: "If acquiescence or implied ratification were enough
to show delegation of authority to take actions within the area of
questionable constitutionality, we might agree . . . that delegation

has been shown here." 97 But the Court did not agree. Instead, it
94. 860 U.S. at 506.
95. The Industrial Security Program originated in a War Department Circular
of Feb. 5, 1942. REroar oF THE ComnssioN oN GovERNrmUwT SEcUrmTY 287 n.7

(1957).
96. That fact had been reported to both the President and Congress. Id. at 262.
97. 860 U.S. at 506.
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held that in this area of questionable constitutionality, "it must be
made clear that the President or Congress, within their constitutional powers specifically has decided that the imposed procedures
are necessary and warranted and has authorized their use ...
Such decisions cannot be assumed by acquiescence or non-action." 98
There are many fields within "the area of doubtful constitutionality." Will the new principle be applied in all? And if it were, what
would be the impact on the bureaucracy which frequently acts in
reliance upon executive delegation through silent consent?
II. Tim CONDUCT OF FORmGN RELATONS
A. Executive Agreements
Guy W. Capps,Inc. v. United States9 9 presented the Warren Court

with an opportunity to make a major constitutional pronouncement
respecting the President's power to enter into executive agreements. 1°0 However, the Court's contribution was of lesser significance, for it avoided the constitutional question.

To prevent Canadian potatoes from flooding the price-supported
United States market, Congress in the Agricultural Act of 1948 had

given the President power, upon investigation and hearing by the
Tariff Commission, to proclaim a quantitative limitation on potato
imports.' 0 1 But rather than use this method of controlling imports

of Canadian potatoes, the President concluded an executive agreement with Canada. 02 Canada agreed to prevent export to the
United States of potatoes for consumption purposes in return for the
United States' agreement to permit import of Canadian potatoes for
seed purposes under certain conditions. Those conditions included a

requirement that the Canadian exporter demand a guarantee by any
United States seed-potato importer that the potatoes received from

the Canadian shipper would not be sold as "table stock." Guy W.
Capps, Incorporated imported about $150,000 worth of seed pota98. Id. at 507. The Court's authority for this point indicates its novelty. The
oldest case was Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). Others were Scull v. Virginia,
359 U.S. 344 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Watdns v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); and Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
99. 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
100. The question of executive power before the Court in Capps was at least
as important as the question presented by the earlier, more controversial cases
which dealt with the President's power to accept and enforce the Russian government's assignment to the United States government of claims arising from nationalization of the overseas assets of Russian companies. See United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
101. 62 Stat. 1247, 1249 (1948), 7 U.S.C. § 624 b (1958).
102. The agreement was concluded by exchange of notes between the Canadian
Ambassador to the United States and the Acting Secretary of State of the United
States, Nov. 23, 1948. 62 Stat. 3717-19, T.I.A.S. No. 1896. The notes are set forth
in an appendix to the opinion of the Court, 348 U.S. at 305.
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toes, most of which ultimately found their way to consumers'
stomachs instead of farmers' potato patches. The government sued
Capps Incorporated for an amount of damages, equal to the cost of
buying up at support prices an equivalent amount of Americangrown potatoes, on the theory that the assurance executed by the
Capps firm constituted a contract for the benefit of the United States
which it had breached.
Although the district court agreed that the assurance by the
Capps firm constituted an enforceable contract, it held that there
had been "no lack of diligence or care on the part of this defendant
to see to it that its assurance was carried out." 103 In the court of
appeals the government fared no better, but for a very different
reason. Chief Judge Parker, citing the steel seizure case, held that
"the executive agreement was void because it was not authorized
by Congress and contravened provisions of a statute dealing with
the very matter to which it related .. ." 10 The opinion added:
It is argued, however, that the validity of the executive agreement was
not dependent upon the Act of Congress but was made pursuant to the
inherent powers of the President under the Constitution. The answer is
that . . .the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce is not
among the powers incident to the Presidential office, but is expressly
vested by the Constitution in the Congress....
[W]hatever the power of the executive with respect to making executive
trade agreements regulating foreign commerce in the absence of action
by Congress, it is clear that the executive may not through entering into
such an agreement avoid complying with a regulation prescribed by
Congress. 105

The case came to the Warren Court at a most embarrassing time,
when acrid controversy was raging over the Bricker Amendment.
However, the Court avoided the constitutional issue and held that
"the District Court was not clearly in error in making the findings
it did or in directing the verdict for respondent on the ground that
no breach of contract was shown." 106 They concluded that "there is
no occasion for us to consider the other questions discussed 0by the
Court of Appeals. The decision . . . does not rest on them." 1
103. This portion of the district court's unreported opinion is quoted at 348
U.S. 300.
104. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (1953).
105. Id. at 659-60.
100. 348 U.S. at 304-05.
107. Id. at 305.
Professor Arthur Sutherland observed that Judge Parker's opinion had strangely
neglected another provision of the Agricultural Act,
for Section 22 of the Agricultural Act of 1948 includes this clause: "(f) No
proclamation under this section shall be enforced in contravention of any treaty
or other international agreement ... Quite clearly Congress seems to have
expressed its expectation and approval of subsequent efforts to adjust CanadianAmerican differences by agreement, rather than by unilateral proclamation of
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In contrast to the Capps case, the opinions on rehearing in Reid
v. Covert 108 contain probably the most important interpretations of
the powers of the executive branch that the Warren Court has yet
made. The constitutional issues in the case were various and complex. Unfortunately, none of the four equally wide-ranging opinions
in the case represented a majority of the Court. The opinion of the
Court, written by Mr. Justice Black and reflecting the views of four
Justices, did not limit its pronouncements to the circumstances of
the case-civilian dependents of military personnel tried by courtmartial for a capital crime in time of peace.'0 9 But the insistence of
the two concurring justices that Covert be limited to its facts was
if short-lived, limitation upon the authority of the
an important,
0
case."
Although members of the Court disagreed on many important
constitutional questions, most of these were questions of executive
power only tangentially if at all."' But the President's power to
make executive agreements was placed squarely in issue in part II
of Mr. Justice Black's opinion. An Air Force wife had killed her
husband in England and an Army wife had killed her husband in
Japan, and in each case the jurisdiction of the United States flowed
from executive agreements with the respective countries, which
provided for trial of such cases by United States military courts in
return for cession of primary jurisdiction by the foreign nation." 2
Congress had vested United States' jurisdiction under those executive agreements in military courts by article 2(11) of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, which provides that "all persons serving
with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the
continental limits of the United States .

are subject to that

import fees or embargoes.
Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment, Executive Agreements, and Imported Potatoes,
67 Haiv. L. RBv. 281, 291 (1958).

108. 854 U.S. 1 (1957).
109. The opinion is somewhat equivocal in its explanation of the extent to which
it would recognize military jurisdiction over civilians in time of war. But the
language leans toward recognition of jurisdiction in limited circumstances. Compare
354 U.S. at 14, 21, 22, with id. at 33-35.
110. The exemption of civilians from the jurisdiction of military courts was
subsequently extended to all civilians in noncapital as well as capital cases. See
text accompanying notes 132-43 infra.
111. Members of the Court disagreed on these important constitutional questions:
whether the case fell within the fifth amendment exemption of "cases arising in
the land or naval forces"; whether, if it did not, Congress might nevertheless provide
for trial by court-martial under the necessary and proper clause in conjunction with
its art. 1, § 8 power to make rules "for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces."
112. Great Britain:Executive Agreement of July 27, 1942, 57 Stat. 1193, E.A.S. No.
355. Japan: Administrative Agreement, 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3341 (1952), T.I.A.S. No.
2492.
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code. 3 The government contended that denial of jury trial and
other intrusions upon the protections of the Bill of Rights resulting
from prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice can
be sustained as ... necessary and proper to carry out the United

States' obligations under the international agreements made with
those countries.""' To this contention Mr. Justice Black replied:
The obvious and decisive answer to this, of course, is that no agreement
with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other

branch of the Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution.
The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all

branches of the National Government and they cannot be nullified by the
Executive or by the Executive and the Senate combined."

5

Since Justices Frankfurter and Harlan agreed that the statute, as
applied, was unconstitutional, it is clear that they also rejected the

government's contention that this application of the statute could
be sustained as legislation necessary and proper to carry out the
executive agreement. And not even the dissenters, Justices Clark
and Burton, gave the slightest intimation of support for that portion
of the government's argument in their dissent. On this question,
therefore, the Court appeared to be unanimous.
Thus was laid to rest, insofar as any Supreme Court decision can
ever finally dispose of any great constitutional problem, a question
that had been troublesome at least since Missouri v. Holland."6 Indeed, Mr. Justice Black took pains to make this final determination
clear even to the most ardent supporters of the Bricker Amendment
by stating: 'There is nothing new or unique about what we say here.
This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy
of the Constitution over a treaty. . . . There is nothing in Missouri
v. Holland . . . which is contrary to the position taken here." "r

After denying that any constitutional support for court-martial of
civilian dependents under article 2(11) could be derived from the
executive powers, the Court considered other possible bases for
constitutionality. Finding none, the Court held that these defendants had been deprived of rights guaranteed by the Constitution "in
its entirety.""" Mr. Justice Black, for four members of the Court,
rejected the contention that "only those constitutional rights which
are 'fundamental' protect Americans abroad," and insisted that
113. 10 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1958).
114. 354 U.S. at 16.
115. Id. at 16-17.
116. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
117. 354 U.S. at 17-18.
118. Id. at 18. The Court emphasized the fact that court-martial did not meet the
constitutional requirements of art. III, § 2 or the fifth and sixth amendments.
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"when the United States acts against citizens abroad . . . it can

only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution."" 9 Although there had admittedly been denial of trial
by jury, even trial by court-martial includes a number of the procedural rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.120 Thus, the question
posed by Mr. Justice Black's dictum is which of the various limitations expressed in the Constitution are "imposed by the Constitution."
The meaning and importance of the dictum became clear in the
context of the entire opinion. The position of Mr. Justice Black was
that the United States government in exerting jurisdiction over a
civilian American citizen abroad is constitutionally bound to accord
him, not merely a "fair trial" by "due process of law" but all the
procedural rights expressed in the Constitution in their most "specific," "literal," and "absolute" sense.' 2 ' The effect of this theory upon executive power seems analogous to the effect that Mr. Justice
Black's familiar theory of "total incorporation" of all Bill of Rights
22
guarantees in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 1
would have upon the procedures required of state criminal prosecutions. Both theories predicate a choice that the procedural guarantees
of the Constitution should be effectuated to the diminution of an
equally supportable conflicting claim of constitutional power. In this
case the Court chose to subordinate the power of the executive to
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights by effectively invalidating those
portions of the executive agreements which conditioned cession of
primary jurisdiction upon agreement to try American civilians by
court-martial.
Almost immediately, Wilson v. Girard'2 ' revealed difficulties in
119. 354 U.S. at 5-6, 8-9, 18.
120. See the following sections of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.
ch. 47: § 827 (counsel); § 831 (self-incrimination); § 837 (court's independence);
§ 838 (counsel); § 844 (double jeopardy); § 846 (subpoena power); § 855 (cruel
or unusual punishment). It is not contended that the scope of each of these protections is the same in court-martial proceedings as it is in federal court.
121. For a discussion of art. I1, § 2 and of the sixth amendment, see 354 U.S. at
7-9. Obviously, trial overseas cannot literally conform to the sixth-amendment
requirement that trial be had "by an impartial jury of the State and. district wherein
If defendants are returned to the
the crime shall have been committed ....
United States for trial in cases like these, attendance of crucial witnesses often may
not be compelled. On the other hand, if Congress can and should create special
United States courts abroad, an American jury would necessarily have to be drawn
largely or entirely from government employees, military or civilian, and their
dependents, all of whom may be subject to the influence of the military command.
It is not likely that Mr. Justice Black, given his views expressed in Reid on despotic
military authority, would consider that such a jury meets constitutional standards
of impartiality. See Mr. Justice Blacks dissent in Dennis v. United States, 839 U.S.
162, 175-76 (1950).
122. See Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68
(1947).
123. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).

1960]

WARREN COURT AND THE EXECUTIVE

661

attempting to make the "total incorporation" theory of Reid a basis
for decision. The facts, in brief, were these: While guarding a
machine-gun during maneuvers in Japan, Girard, using a grenade
launcher attached to his rifle, fired a cartridge case which killed a
Japanese woman gathering brass nearby. Under the United States'
treaty and executive agreement with Japan, primary jurisdiction to
try Girard was in the United States if Girard's act was done in the
line of duty, but in Japan if it was not.124 it is important to bear
in mind that the United States maintained that Girard had acted in
the line of duty and that, until waived, it had primary jurisdiction.
But like the United States' other international agreements on the
subject, that with Japan provides that the state with primary jurisdiction shall give sympathetic consideration to a request that it
waive jurisdiction in any case which is of particular importance to
the other state. Typically, of course, the United States makes rather
than receives such requests, and typically they are granted. When
Japan claimed primary jurisdiction over Girard, the United States
government resisted until international tension became severe. Eventually, for what the Secretaries of State and Defense obliquely admitted in a joint statement to be "reasons of state," 125 the United
States waived jurisdiction. A district court then enjoined the Secretary of Defense from surrendering Girard to Japanese authorities, 20
and amid even greater tension the Supreme Court agreed to extend
its regular term to review this decision immediately.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the district court. The
Court simply declared that since "a sovereign nation has exclusive
jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its
borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its
jurisdiction" and since "Japan's cession to the United States of jurisdiction to try American military personnel for conduct constituting
an offense against the laws of both countries was conditioned" by
the provision for waiver of primary jurisdiction, the "issue for our
decision is therefore narrowed to the question whether . . . the
Constitution . . . prohibited . . . waiver of the qualified jurisdiction granted by Japan." 2 7 The Court found "no constitutional or
124. The Security Treaty with Japan of Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3329,
T.I.A.S. No. 2491, authorizing administrative agreements governing "the disposition
of armed forces . . ." was ratified by the Senate on March 20, 1952. The terms of
the Administrative Agreement Under Art. I of the Security Treaty, Feb. 28, 1952,
3 U.S.T. & O.LA. 3341, T.I.A.S. No. 2492, were known to the Senate at the time
of ratification of the Security Treaty. 98 CoNG. REc. 2376, 2557 (1952). The distribution of jurisdiction referred to in the text was accomplished by a Protocol To
Amend Article XVH of the Administrative Agreement, Sept. 29, 1953, 4 U.S.T. &
O.1A. 1846, T.LA.S. No. 2848.
125. The joint statement of the Secretaries of State and Defense is set forth in
appendix B to the Court's opinion. 354 U.S. at 544.
126. Girard v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1957).
127. 854 U.S. at 529-30.
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statutory barrier" to the waiver of jurisdiction. 2 ' We may agree that
it should not have found anything even if it had looked, but it did
not bother to look. It ignored the rationale of Reid v. Covert and
obviously assumed that Girard was deprived of nothing when the
United States waived jurisdiction in accordance with the terms of
the executive agreement merely because without that agreement
Japan would-have had primary jurisdiction.
The hypothesis of Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Reid v. Covert,
that the exercise of executive powers must be subordinated to all
the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, put the Court in an unnecessarily difficult constitutional posture in Girard. If this rationale had
been applied in Girard,that literal application of the Bill of Rights
seemingly would have entitled Girard to a constitutional right to the
protection of a jury trial, or at least to the procedural protections of
an American court-martial. Assuming, then, the validity of the theory
of "total applicability," how can anyone deny that the Executive
and the Senate, through an agreement and treaty, had negotiated
away Girard's constitutional rights. Yet, we have it on the good and
current authority of Covert that the "prohibitions of the Constitution
were designed to apply to all branches of the National Government
and they cannot be nullified29by the Executive or by the Executive
and the Senate combined." 1
The dilemma which confronted the Warren Court in Girard originated with its decision in Covert and took this form: either all of
the Constitution follows an American serviceman abroad or none of
it does.
There is a logical and just way out of this dilemma, which can be
best understood by hypothetically situating Girard's case at a military post within the United States. Undoubtedly, Congress could
constitutionally provide for his surrender to state authorities and
trial in a state court. But it could not subject him to state trial of a
kind which makes a mockery of due process of law and violates
"those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions." 1o The Court should
have recognized that despite Reid v. Covert, this is also the true and
full measure of the American citizen's constitutional rights as a soldier overseas, and that these fundamental rights have been scrupulously preserved in treaties and agreements by the President, the
Senate, and American executive authorities abroad.' 8 '
128. Id. at 530.
129. 854 U.S. at 17. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
130. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937), quoting Hebert v. Louisiana,
272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
131. For a thorough consideration of the manner in which United States treaties
and agreements have been implemented to assure military personnel of fair trials
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In three recent cases, the Warren Court was again confronted
with the basic problem of Girard and Covert: that of deciding the
scope of the constitutional limitations upon executive action affecting United States citizens abroad. In none of these cases did the
Court formulate a constitutional rationale adequate to clarify the
meaning of Girard and Covert; but the results of the decisions are
all too clear: The Court has effectively deprived Congress and the
Executive of power to discipline by court-martial any member of
the civilian entourage which accompanies the United States armed
forces overseas in time of peace. 132 A further result is that the extent
of the President's power to enter into the administrative agreements
important to the maintenance of United States military establishments on foreign soil has been substantially limited.
Each case presented an altered version of the facts in Covertthe basic problem in each concerned the authority of the military to
try United States civilians by court-martial pursuant to the terms of
executive agreements with foreign nations. Kinsella v. United States
ex rel. Singleton 133 held that a civilian dependent of a member of
the armed forces overseas could not be tried by court-martial for a
noncapital offense. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardol4
and Grisham v. Hagan13' held that civilian employees of the armed
forces overseas could not be tried by court-martial for noncapital
or capital offenses, respectively. However, the basis for decision
in these cases is not so easily discerned.
Only in Singleton did the Court give any substantial consideration
to the development of a rationale for decision. And there it relied
upon a formalistic interpretation
of Congress' power to "govern" and
"regulate" the armed forces. 3 The Court reasoned that the test for
military jurisdiction was one of "military status," and that the nonmilitary status of the petitioning civilian dependent placed her outside the "unambiguous language" of the Constitution and exempted
her from court-martial jurisdiction. 37 This rationale seemed to be
the primary basis for decision in Guagliardoas well. 138
in foreign courts, see Note, Criminal Jurisdiction Over American Forces Abroad, 70
HA1y. L. REv. 1043 (1957).
132. The authority of these cases is undoubtedly limited to times of peace. See
McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281. 285--86 (1960); Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957). Today's unstable conditions, often neither peace
nor war, may raise difcult questions for the Court.
133. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).

134. 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
135.361 U.S. 278 (1960).
136. "The Congress shall have power ... to make rules
and regulation of the land and naval forces.
U.S. CONST.
137. 361 U.S. at 240-41, 243.
138. 361 U.S. at 284, 286. However, the Court stated that
Singleton, controlled the result in Guagliardo. Id. at 283-84.

for the government
art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
Grisham, as well as
Whatever may have
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The Singleton rationale, which was based upon the civilianstatus
of the petitioner, could logically have controlled the result in Grisham as well. There, the Court could have ignored the capital nature
of the offense and simply stated that a civilian employee of the
armed forces is not in a "military status" and is therefore not subject
to military jurisdiction. Instead, it held that Covert controlled the
result, because "the death penalty is so irreversible . . ." that civil-

ian employees as well as dependents charged with a capital crime
"must have the benefit of a jury." 139
Since the Court most fully developed the Singleton rationale, it
would seem to be the most significant. But it is delusive for one
to rely upon the Court's future continued adherence to such a formalistic approach where the problem is the difficult one of balancing
constitutional protections and powers. Similar considerations counsel
caution in attributing the results of the cases to an unannounced
triumph of Mr. Justice Black's theory of the applicability of the total
protections of the Bill of Rights, though that may be a permissible
explanation. It is significant that the reasons the majority gave for
the result in Grisham did not go so far: the defendant was entitled
to a jury trial - a literal requirement of the Bill of Rights - for reasons that imply peculiarly due process considerations. Various examples of such equivocation could be drawn from the opinions, 40 but
for purposes of predicting the future course of the constitutional
limitations which the Court has imposed upon Congress and the
Executive, it is sufficient to observe that while Mr. Justice Clark's
new position 1 4' has for the present led to results in favor of "total
applicability," his formalistic and equivocal statements of the bases
for decision indicate that he has not committed himself.' 42 If that

is so, the Court may yet relieve the military departments of the
executive branch of the difficult disciplinary problem which these
decisions have imposed upon those responsible for maintaining order
been the precise basis for the Court's decision in Grisham, discussed in the text
accompanying note 139 infra, some hints of both the "total applicability" and "due
process" approaches may be discerned in Guagliardo. A brief discussion centered
specifically on trial by jury. Id. at 284. Yet the description of Grisham was couched
in due process terms, which emphasized the "capital crime" basis of that decision.

Ibid.

139. 361 U.S. at 280.
140. Compare, e.g., 361 U.S. 243 with 361 U.S. 246, 249.
141. Mr. Justice Clark dissented in Covert, rejecting both the "total applicability"
theory and the "due process" theory of limitations upon the power to "govern" and
"regulate."
142. Neither Mr. Justice Whittaker nor Mr. Justice Stewart participated in
Covert, and both may also be regarded as "uncommitted" with respect to the broad
question of the nature of the constitutional limitations upon the power of United
States officials in dealing with United States citizens abroad. However, with respect
to the power of Congress to "govern" and "regulate" the armed forces, their position,
as stated in dissent by Mr. Justice Whittaker, is that such power "is independent
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at overseas military establishments.14 3 The Court may yet take the
advice of Professor Sutherland:
The basic decencies of the Bill of Rights should be guides for our officials
everywhere. This does not mean that all details of the first eight amendments are mandatory procedure for every American official abroad ...
We are necessarily remitted to some such standard
as that imposed on
44
state officials by the fourteenth amendment.

B. Passportsand Travel Control
146
In Kent v. Dulles'45 and its companion case, Dayton v. Dulles,

the Warren Court adopted as narrow a view of executive power as
it has yet expressed. The position adopted in the opinion by Mr.

Justice Douglas had the support of a bare majority of the Court.
The cases were brought by United States citizens whose applications
for passports had been refused. Kent was denied a passport primarily because he refused to submit a non-Communist affidavit required
by State Department regulations. 47 Dayton had submitted an affi-

davit, had had a hearing, and had ultimately been refused a passport
on review and findings by the Secretary of State himself-findings

which clearly had been made after consideration of confidential information.

48

In Kent the Court held that the narrow construction

ordinarily applied to powers that restrict personal liberty required a
finding that in the absence of explicit congressional delegation, the
Secretary of State had no power to curtail the liberty to travel by

withholding passports on grounds of belief or association. Kent was
made the vehicle of decision and Dayton was settled on its authority.

With some important exceptions, a passport has generally not

been required in order to enter or leave the country.' 49 However, in
of and not restricted by Article III or the fifth and sixth amendments.
361
U.S. at 273.
143. Some relief may come from adoption of the Court's suggestions of alternatives to the present statutory declaration of jurisdiction by means of temporarily
inducting employees into the services, or by obtaining a waiver of rights prior to
departure for overseas stations. 361 U.S. at 286-87. However, should a case arise
involving such procedures, the Court may find it necessary to avoid the claim that
an otherwise unavailable power may not be created through the imposition of an
unconstitutional condition upon government employment. See generally Hale,
Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLuM. L. REv. 321
(195).
144. Sutherland, The Flag, The Constitution, and International Agreements, 68
HAnv.L. BEy. 1374, 1380-81 (1955).
145. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
146. 357 U.S. 144 (1958).
147. The Secretary of State, in 1952, issued a regulation, still in effect, under
which a passport applicant may be required to make a statement under oath "with
respect to present or past membership in the Communist Party." 22 C.F.R. § 51.142

(1958).
148. 857 U.S. at 148-49.
149. In tracing the history of congressional and executive use of passports to
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1952 Congress passed an act which provides that in time of war or
national emergency, on presidential proclamation, it is "unlawful for
any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter ...the
United States unless he bears a valid passport." 150 That provision
had originally been incorporated in a wartime emergency measure,
the operation of which had been extended by Congress until 1953.151
As re-enacted in the 1952 act, the provision effectively accorded control over travel abroad to the Secretary of State and formed the
basis for constitutional objection to the regulations through which
the Secretary exercised his discretionary power to control the issuance of passports.
Although they are distinct powers, the power to forbid exit without a passport makes the nature of the power to refuse a passport allimportant because, as the Court in Kent for the first time proclaimed
(and as the government there acknowledged), a citizen's liberty to
travel abroad is protected by "due process." 152 Before 1856 the Secretary of State issued passports in his discretion wholly as an exercise
of inherent executive power.1 53 And in that year Congress adopted
an act, still in effect, which by its language appears to recognize an
inherent executive power: "The Secretary of State may grant and
issue passports . ..under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe .. .,154 Moreover, Mr. Justice Douglas could
hardly deny that there is "a large body of precedents" and massive
official and scholarly opinion which hold that issuance of a passport
is a "discretionary act."' In Kent, the government contended that
Congress had acquiesced in the Secretary of State's discretionary
control over issuance of passports. Douglas' response to that conregulate travel, the Court observed that as early as 1815, during the War of 1812,
and again during the Civil War, Congress and the Executive had asserted power to
prevent citizens from crossing into enemy territory without first obtaining a passport.
A broader power was claimed during World War I when Congress, as an emergency
measure, asserted the power to prevent entry or departure from the country without
a valid patsport while a Presidential Proclamation was in force. 40 Stat. 559 (1918).
The same statute, amended for use in the World War II emergency, 55 Stat. 252
(1941), had been invoked by Presidential Proclamation No. 2528 on Nov. 14, 1941.
55 Stat. 1696 (1941). See the Court's discussion, 857 U.S. at 122-124.
150. 66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185(b) (1958).
151. The original 1918 emergency measure as adapted for use in 1941, see note
149 supra, was extended by Congress until April 1, 1958 by 66 Stat. 830, 888 (1952).
See 857 U.S. at 124.
152. Id. at 125.
153. The Court pointed out that the passport had originally been regarded primarily as a form of credentials which simplified foreign travel, and that prior to
1856, issuance of various documents serving the functions of passports had been
undertaken by various federal, state, and local officials and notaries public. Id. at
121-23. Apparently there had been little question raised as to that power.
154. 11 Stat. 52, 60-61 (1856). The original statute was codified with insignificant
modification in 1926. 44 Stat. 887, 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1958).
155. 857 U.S. at 124-25.
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tention denied sub silentio any inherent power in the executive. He
said, with some scholarly support, that "the key to that problem
*.. is in the manner in which the Secretary's discretion was exercised, not in the bare fact that he had discretion."" 6 Thus, he
treated the statute as having delegated power to be exercised only
in accordance with particular procedures; and then refused to recognize, in spite of substantial evidence, that Congress had intended
to delegate the power to institute procedures for denial of passports
on grounds of belief or association.
There was strong evidence that Congress had intended either to
recognize such power as inherent, or to delegate it. Mr. Justice
Douglas found that denial of passports previously had been based
on only two grounds in the State Department's peacetime practice:
noncitizenship and criminal activity.' 57 However, Mr. Justice Clark
rightly stated in the dissenting opinion that this proposition, "vital to
the Court's final conclusion," is "contrary to fact." 58 The Court's
opinion admitted that ever since the Russian Revolution the Department occasionally bad denied passports to Communists, but argued
that the practice had not "jelled" into a third ground for denial by
1926 when the Secretary's statutory power was incorporated in the
United States Code. 159 True, after 1926 passports were frequently
denied on grounds of Communist Party membership. 1 0 True also,
although unmentioned in the majority opinion, the legislative history of the war measures forbidding travel without a passport clearly
shows Congress recognized the Secretary's discretion to deny passports on security grounds. Indeed, any such law is essentially meaningless otherwise. Furthermore, the provision in the act of 1952 was
designed to supplant and make permanently available the substance
of that emergency legislation, and Congress knew that the Secretary
exercised his discretion to deny passports to Communists and expected that he would continue to do so.'(' Still, the Court in Kent
hesitated "to impute to Congress, when in 1952 it made a passport
necessary for foreign travel and left its issuance to the discretion of
the Secretary of State, a purpose to give him unbridled discretion
to grant or withhold a passport from a citizen for any substantive
reason he may choose." 162
Some critics may question whether the power to deny passports
156. Id. at 125.
157. Id. at 127.
158. Id. at 189.
159. Id. at 128.
160. Ibid.
161. The legislative history is cited and discussed in the dissenting opinion. Id.
at 136-87. It is hardly to be supposed that Congress was interested only in interdicting foreign travel of aliens and ordinary criminals in this period.
162. Id. at 128.
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necessarily arises from a congressional delegation of power-the
case thus raises an important, but unresolved, problem as to the
extent of executive power subsisting independent of any delegation.
Further, it may appear to some that the Court concluded that for the
Secretary to prescribe Communist Party membership and activity
as the ground for denial is equivalent to his restricting the travel of
people with red hair or blue eyes if the fancy strikes him. But the
problem here is really the same as that posed in connection with
Greene v. McElroy-that is, the requisite specificity with which
power must be delegated and the degree of specificity which may
be attributed to delegation by silence. Again the Court avoided
the question of the constitutionality of the executive regulations by
insisting upon explicit evidence of a delegation.
CONCLUSIONS

No less an authority than Max Weber pointed to the conflict
always potentially present between a modem bureaucracy and the

judiciary, particularly in Anglo-American jurisdictions:
For the field of administrative activity proper, that is, for all state
activities that fall outside the field of law creation and court procedure,
one is accustomed to claiming the freedom and paramountcy of individual
circumstances. General norms are held to play primarily a negative role
as barriers to the official's positive and "creative" activity, which should
Yet the point that is "freely" creative adminisnever be regulated ....
tration . . . does not constitute a realm of free, arbitrary action, of mercy,
and of personally motivated favor and valuation . . . is a very decisive
point. The rule and the rational estimation of "objective" purposes, as
well as devotion to them, always exist as a norm of conduct. In the field
of executive administration, especially where the "creative" arbitrariness
of the official is most strongly built up, the specifically modem and strictly
"objective" idea of "reasons of state" is upheld as the supreme and ultimate
guiding star of the official's behavior.163

But he observed of the judicial process:
American adjudication of the highest courts is still to a great extent em[F]ormal
pirical; and especially is it adjudication by precedents. ...
judgments are rendered, though not by subsumption under rational concepts, but by drawing on "analogies" and by depending upon and interpreting concrete "precedents." This is "empmical justice." . . . [lit postulates substantive justice oriented toward some concrete instance and person; and such an "ethos" will unavoidably collide with the formalism and
the rule-bound
and cool "matter-of-factness" of bureaucratic adminis164
tration.

No words could be found more prophetic of the problems faced by
the Warren Court as it attempts to provide substantive justice in
163. GmnTH & MILLs, FRoM MAx WEBm: EssAYs IN SOCIOLOGY 220 (1958).

164.

Id. at 216-17, 220. -

1960]

WARREN COURT AND THE EXECUTIVE

669

concrete instances for persons affected by the Executive's cool, rational, objective determination of the measures required by "reasons
of state" for protection of the security of the country in the Cold
War. 165 It is a measure of Weber's wisdom that he did not denigate
the vital purposes of either the bureaucracy or the judiciary when
such conflict of purpose occurred. His wisdom certainly deserves attention, both by those members of the legal profession who recently
accused the Warren Court of paralyzing internal security by invoking "technicalities emanating from our judicial process," 6 and by
the many political scientists who have regularly, and somewhat monotonously, denounced efforts of the executive branch to protect the
nation's security as merely irrational and viciously unjust.
The impact of the Warren Court's decisions upon the executive
branch can be summed up only tentatively. What the record makes
clearest is the willingness of the Court to place limitations on executive power. There is a concept of executive power which tempts its
holders to regard any new legal restriction upon executive discretion
as somehow a subtraction from and diminution of the President's
power. Some critics, out of their rightful concern for the maintenance of a strong Presidency in today's world seem to have adopted
that concept. However, the Warren Court has properly rejected it,
for this concept of power is a logical fallacy, though perhaps alluring
because it seems scientific. The President's power is not a quantum
which will eventually be amenable to expression in mathematical
terms when the calculus by which to compute it has been perfected.
The analogy of executive power to horsepower is fatally misleading.
The power of a President rests ultimately upon public confidence,
based upon the belief that there are certain things he cannot lawfully do, and would not even attempt to do. Thus, a rule that
the President may not arbitrarily remove an officer performing
quasi-judicial functions, invoked in Wiener, or a rule that he cannot
by an executive agreement deprive American citizens abroad of
their fundamental right to due process, which is the likely meaning
of Covert and its progeny and Girardin combination, or the rule
enforced in Vitarelli that in removing an official on security grounds
the executive must observe the constitutionally required procedural
regulations which he has proclaimed, may each ultimately enhance
rather than diminish the power of a democratic executive.
In some cases, particularly Peters v. Hobby and Greene v. Mc165. It is not suggested that all discussion of the problem of internal security, or
all action taken by legislative and executive authorities, state and national, has been
"cool" and "rational." But it can fairly be argued that measures taken under presidential authority can be so described.
166. Amnuc
BAR AssocrATioN, REPORT OF THE Cosmrrun ON COMMUNI T
TAC cS, STnATmGY, AND OBJECnES 6 (1959).
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Elroy, there appears a tendency to insist on an unrealistic and undesirable formalism in the relations between the President and his
assistants in the executive branch. If that requirement were to be
dogmatically extended beyond the realm of executive procedures
which present difficult constitutional questions, it would be a serious
and unjustifiable judicial encroachment upon executive authority.
Mr. Justice Reed's admonition against analogizing these relations
between superior and subordinates to those which obtain between
coordinate legislative and executive branches is a wise one. Indeed,
it would be remarkable were these analogies extended by a Chief
Justice who has had important and substantial experience as an executive head of a great government.
A brief comment concerning the Warren Court's attitude towards
Congress is relevant to any evaluation of the Court's treatment of
executive power. Lawyers and scholars have frequently noted the
general tendency of the Warren Court to continue the great deference toward legislative policy that has been characteristic of the Supreme Court since 1937. As we have seen, these cases concerning
executive power have frequently involved construction of statutes
claimed in a number of cases to be unconstitutional. It is true that
only in Reid v. Covert and its progeny did the Court hold a statute
invalid, and even there only as applied. In other cases the Court
interpreted the statutes and thereby avoided questioning their validity -notably in Cole v. Young, Service v. Dulles, Harmon v. Brucker, and the passport cases. This, one may arguably entitle, deference
to Congress, for in a sense it is. But one should not overlook
the fact that Congress, rather than the Executive, might have
been charged more often with being the constitutional culprit had
the Court adopted other quite justifiable interpretations of the statutes and of legislative intent. Indeed, the deference shown to Congress in Service v. Dulles and the passport cases seems to take the
orm of insisting that despite the "legislative history," Congress
could not have intended what it wrote. Such deference seems more
than slightly Pickwickian.
If these are the main re.sults of the Warren Court's treatment of
executive power, what is to be said of the technique by which they
have characteristically been achieved? Professor Pritchett, in The
Political Offender and the Warren Court, has described that technique as follows:
Where the Court has contrived to invalidate official action, which it has
done rather often, it has typically been for rather narrow reasons ...
[C]ertainly the starting point . . . is recognition of the caution the Warren
Court has shown in taking new constitutional positions as to the rights of
political offenders. The libertarian effects which the Court has recently
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achieved have been secured for the most part through the interpretation
of statutes, not through the interposition of constitutional barriers. 67

When the issues facing the Court are so novel and so grave, there is
certainly much to commend in the gingerly tentativeness with which
the Court has approached their resolution. But in speaking of the
Court's "obligation to judge," Professor Pritchett added:
If the Supreme Court's primary obligation is to avoid taking a position
on matters of acute public controversy or where the interests which the
Court is protecting are not substantial enough to give the Court a
reasonable measure of support if a hue and cry is raised by the decision,
then this recent experience suggests that the self-restraint doctrine needs
to be reformulated. 68

The Warren Court has frequently avoided premature decision of
constitutional questions only at the price of appearing disingenuous.
At times, especially in Greene v. McElroy and Kent v. Dulles, the
Warren Court has almost seemed to create an irrebuttable presumption of presidential and congressional ignorance. And its versions of
the process of government have occasionally taxed credulity. But
the worst damage wrought by such opinions is likely to be upon the
Court itself, for men who begin to suspect, however wrongly, that
their judges are less than candid in appraising the facts, are soon
likely to distrust their statements of the law. Both the Court and its
critics need to take thought promptly about means by which such
consequences may be avoided.
There are, of course, canons of propriety that control what may
be said in a Supreme Court opinion. But would they have been seriously breached had the Court spoken to the President and Congress
in words like the following?: "When we say that you did not know
and did not intend that members of the executive branch would do
what they have done, we do not mean that you were unaware of
their probable or subsequent action, or that you did not in some
more or less casual way approve their acts. What we do mean is that
we are not sure that you were aware of the full consequences of the
acts that you tacitly approved. What we ask of you, before we must
pass upon these consequences, is your reconsideration of them and
your renewed assurance that in full knowledge of them you have
concluded that the public interest requires that they be borne."
Traditionalists may assert that such candor would have been improper. Certainly, it would seem to be a frank expression of a farreaching claim of judicial power. But such a suspensory veto would
be little different from the power that the Warren Court has in fact
167. PmTCrmrHr,

(1958).
168. Id. at 71.
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exercised and would merely amount to judicial recognition and implementation of what has long been a truism among constitutional
scholars: that the only kind of veto which the Court has ever held
over publicly supported governmental action is a kind of suspensory
or delaying power. The benefits of such a frank approach would be
found in the Court's willingness to accept less formalistic evidence
of exercise of executive or congressional powers. Further, an admission that a greater freedom of action is justified in the Court's use
of its suspensory veto power would be an interesting parallel to the
Warren Court's invention in the public school integration decisions
of the novel and socially useful principle that governmental actions
admittedly less than constitutional may under appropriate circumstances be given temporary judicial sanction. Both principles represent constitutional relativism at its best.

